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Often, however, those conflicts are between the boss and the employee.  An interesting post in Fast Company discusses boss-employee conflicts. One great thing about this article is that it provides lots of references and hyperlinks to other resources! Check it out and comment back on this page to let us know what you think.

• Understanding the structure of negotiation
• Recognizing the culture of the negotiation
• Preparing for stakeholders
• How to identify stakeholders
• How to work with stakeholders
• Responding to SURPRISES

Understanding who the real parties are and how to involve them will enhance your skills and lead to better outcomes.

The seminar is scheduled for 10:30 AM (Mountain) 12:30 PM (Eastern) Thursday, February 16, 2012.  When you register for the seminar you will receive access information to let you join in by telephone. This seminar is interactive, giving you a chance to ask questions and discuss topics with the presenters.

HOW TO REGISTER: You may register by sending a check for $49.95, along with your email address, to Negotiation Guidance Associates at: 408 Arikaree Peak Dr., Livermore, CO 80536. Or you may register through PayPal by clicking on THIS LINK.

SEMINAR BROCHURE: Download a PDF of the seminar brochure: Tele-seminar brochure

PRESENTERS: Presenters in the seminar will be Berton Lee Lamb, Susan K. Driver, and Russell C. Sanders.

Dr. Cindy T. Christen

Negotiation researchers have identified a number of factors that can influence selection of cooperative or noncooperative strategies. These can include objective factors, such as overlapping preferences, interests or goals, and subjective factors, such as perceptions of the power and trustworthiness of contending parties and the nature of the relationship between parties (see, for example, Fisher, 1989).

It is worth noting, however, that much of the research on strategy selection in conflict situations has been conducted in Western cultural contexts. In today’s world of interconnected economies, ecologies, and communication technologies, the conflicts that arise often span political boundaries and involve multiple cultures. In selecting strategies for managing a conflict, and anticipating the likely strategies of other parties to the conflict, it is important to know if factors such as power, trustworthiness, and type of relationship have similar effects on strategic choice in different cultures.

Hofstede (1980, 1991) identifies five dimensions that characterize cultural differences, with Western countries tending to be more individualistic and short-term oriented and Eastern countries more collectivistic and long-term oriented. Yum (1988) further distinguishes between the cultures of East Asian countries such as Korea (being affected by Confucianism) and Southeast Asian countries (being influenced by Buddhism).  In countries and cultures influenced by Confucianism, Yum explains, family and other group affiliations are more important than the self, maintenance of proper relationships takes priority over individual interests, and relationships are typically based on long-term, asymmetrical reciprocity and trust. In line with these cultural distinctions, one can predict that negotiators in countries influenced by Confucianism will place greater value on relationship maintenance, be more likely to trust a powerful external group, and more willing to accept negotiation outcomes that are distributively unfair to resolve the conflicts than will their counterparts from Western countries.

Two recent studies by Lee, Christen and Kim demonstrate that distinctions between Eastern and Western cultures can indeed moderate the effects of power, trustworthiness, and relationship type on selection of cooperative and noncooperative strategies. Survey questionnaires were administered concurrently to members of professional communication associations in Seoul, Korea and Denver, Colorado. Each questionnaire contained one of six manipulated conflict scenarios involving a major automobile manufacturer and a consumer advocacy organization. Scenarios addressed either an ethical concern regarding automobile pollution or an economic concern regarding an automobile defect. A personal relationship, professional relationship, or no relationship existed between managers representing the two organizations.

As predicted, Korean professionals were more likely than U.S. professionals to prefer cooperative strategies such as mediation and avoidance (Lee, Christen & Kim, 2011). Contrary to expectations, Korean professionals were also more inclined to choose contention, perhaps as a power balancing technique. The influence of culture on preference for mediation, avoidance, and contention strategies was observed for both ethical and economic conflicts, and across the three types of relationships. However, relationship type emerged as the strongest predictor that both Korean and U.S. professionals would choose the compromise as an option for resolving the dispute. Korean professionals were more likely than their U.S. counterparts to exercise power if the relationship between managers at the two organizations was professional in nature, more inclined to deny that a conflict existed if a personal relationship existed between the two managers, and more likely to choose mediation if there was no relationship between managers.

Although power and trustworthiness were not explicitly manipulated in the conflict scenarios, secondary analysis revealed distinctions in the way Korean and U.S. professionals responded to perceptions of the power and trustworthiness of the two parties when selecting strategies for managing the dispute (Christen, Lee & Kim, 2011). Professionals in the U.S. were more likely to view their own organization (the automobile manufacturer) as powerful, while Korean professionals attributed greater power to the external group (the consumer advocacy organization). Among Korean professionals, perceptions that the consumer advocacy organization was powerful and trustworthy were positively related as expected. Also as expected, Korean professionals were more likely than U.S. professionals to select cooperative strategies in dealing with an external organization they viewed as powerful and trustworthy. Unexpectedly, a negative association was found between perceived trustworthiness and the likelihood that U.S. professionals would select a compromise strategy, perhaps because they perceived trustworthiness to be an indicator of weakness.

While culture emerged as the strongest predictor of three out of the four conflict management strategies examined, it should be noted that the studies conducted by Lee, Christen and Kim were experimental and limited in focus. To provide negotiators with practical guidance regarding strategy selection in different cultural contexts, it will be important to extend this line of research to other countries and cultures.

Cindy Christen is an associate professor in the Department of Journalism and Technical Communication at Colorado State University. Cindy conducts research on factors influencing willingness to negotiate solutions to inter-group conflicts, and the effects of group membership on perceptions of news coverage and public opinion about conflicts.

Click here to see the REFERENCES for this essay.

“Keys to Resolving Workplace Conflicts” is a one-hour presentation where you will learn:

• 4 root causes of workplace conflict
• 3 key steps that can help resolve workplace conflict
• The one question you need to ask every new candidate for your team that will help reduce conflict.

To schedule Dr. Lamb or Dr. Sanders for this presentation please contact us using the CONTACT form.  The presentation is supported by hand-outs, and is followed by a question and answer session.  The price of this presentation is $499, plus travel expenses.

Negotiation skills improve with practice and training. Most people have received some level of training or guidance in negotiation and almost everyone has a wealth of experience. Professionals from all walks of life tell us they need more, but they don’t have the time to devote to a long training course. We have designed Step Up to Negotiation to meet these needs.

By addressing four vital negotiation skills Step Up to Negotiation gives professionals a quick refresher on bargaining, allows people to learn from one another, and provides an opportunity for everyone to interact with experienced negotiation coaches.

The subjects covered in the seminar:
1. Why Negotiate? We explore this topic as a way to reflect on when negotiation is necessary and understand the alternatives to bargaining.
2. The Building Blocks of Negotiation Strategy. In this segment of the seminar we look at three basic negotiation strategies, how to choose among them, and how to diagnose the strategies being used against you. We also discuss how to move away from less productive strategies toward more positive approaches.
3. How to Prepare for Negotiation. In this part of the course everyone works together to outline the most important planning tools. Planning is essential to a successful negotiation. Everyone gains from this discussion.
4. How to Present Yourself in a Negotiation. This part of the course is about good communication skills. Almost all of our clients tell us that they need to improve on listening and presenting. This part of the seminar underscores those skills and gives everyone a chance to enhance their abilities.

Step Up to Negotiation is a seminar. The seminar format relies on everyone’s participation. Interaction and learning from others is a great way to get the most out of this short training session! One part of that interaction comes from a negotiation exercise at the conclusion of the training.  Each participant has an opportunity to negotiate in a non-threatening scenario, followed by instructor feedback and suggestions.  Every student receives a course book with notes and reading materials for future reference as well as a frame-able certificate of completion. The seminar begins at 8:30 am and ends at 4:30 pm.

Comments about training by Dr. Lamb and Dr. Sanders:

“Thank you, Lee. It was great class and I learned much about the finer points of negotiation as well as restructured the main principles of negotiation in my mind.”

“I got a lot out of the training and have already put it to good use.”

“I thoroughly enjoyed meeting you and learning from you. Your experience and expertise really showed during the class, which made for a great learning experience. I hope to attend the follow up course at colorado or nctc which ever my supervisor approves. I will be sure to keep you updated on my upcoming negotiation with the oil and gas company.”

“I really enjoyed the course. It is very relevant to my position and I’m already recommending the course to colleagues.”

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If I take a $5 bill from my wallet and offer it to you, no strings attached, what would be your response?  You might hesitate a moment – maybe you don’t fully trust me – and ask a question or two to clarify my offer, making sure that nothing is required of you in return.  Honestly, no strings attached.

Dr. Steven Smutko University of Wyoming

Chances are very good that you would take the $5 bill, thank me, and pocket it.  After all, why wouldn’t you take an offer of free money?  Well, game theory shows us that it depends on the circumstances surrounding the offer.

Let’s change the circumstances slightly.  Prior to offering you $5, I mention that I have recently been offered a gift of some cash.  A benefactor, who will remain anonymous, wants to give me $100.  This is all on the up and up.  No thievery is involved, the money is truly honest money, offered by a benevolent citizen of our community.  But in order for me to receive the money, I have to share part of it with another person.  I have chosen you.  The kicker is I can make only one offer to share the $100, in any amount that I choose.  If you accept my offer, I will receive the $100 and then will pay you your share.  If you refuse my offer, neither of us gets any money.  Got it?  OK, I offer you $5, no strings attached.  Do you take it?

Chances are, you won’t.  Even though you would have accepted $5 from me had I offered it without the narrative about a benefactor’s donation, now $5 is not enough.  You refuse, and neither of us gets the cash.  Is this rational behavior on your part?  This is the essence of the Ultimatum Game. The Ultimatum Game shows us that the concept of fairness plays a strong role in our rational decision making.  The game has been played by thousands of MBA students, and the offers recorded.  Had I, the allocator, offered you, the recipient, $50 and you behaved like an MBA student, it is nearly certain that you would accept.  But the acceptance rate declines precipitously below that mark.  An offer of $20 will be rejected 70% of the time.  It is not until we get to an offer of about $35 that that there is a greater than fifty-fifty chance that you will accept.  Most recipients view anything below $35 to be an unfair allocation.

I experienced a version of the Ultimatum Game during negotiations among a utility company seeking a new federal license to continue its hydropower operations in southern Appalachia and multiple parties representing interests related to water allocation and environmental protection.  The terms and conditions of a utility company’s license to operate a hydroelectric generating facility are set by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on a case by case basis.  It is not uncommon for utility companies to attempt to negotiate an agreement among the many stakeholders affected by its hydropower operations prior to submitting its application to the FERC.  If a utility company can secure a robust agreement prior to its license submittal, the FERC is likely to grant a license consistent with this agreement, thereby reducing the risk to the company of some unknown, potentially costly license conditions.

In this case, I was serving as a third-party neutral, helping the parties seek consensus on how a large hydropower project was to operate while protecting recreational and environmental values in the watershed.  The company had floated an offer that consisted of regulating flows so that anglers could fish for trout below the dam at low flows in the mornings and evenings when fishing is good; rafters could take advantage of high flows on hot summer days; minimum flows would be secured to protect aquatic life; and lakeshore homeowners above the dam could anticipate stable, high water levels.  In addition, recreation facilities and access areas would be constructed above and below the dam.  And to protect water quality and wildlife habitat throughout the watershed, a seemingly generous resource enhancement fund would be available to local governments and nonprofit organizations in the area.

The company and the other negotiators worked together over a number of months to tweak the offer by changing water flow allocations, recreational improvements, and environmental initiatives.  As the deadline for agreement approached, a small conservation nongovernmental organization (NGO) involved in the negotiations rejected the utility company’s offer of a resource enhancement fund. The NGO countered for an amount more than five times the original offer. The company countered with an increase, but nothing near the NGO’s demands. Even though the original offer would have provided the NGO with a significant infusion of new operating dollars to pursue its conservation goals, well above its current operating budget, the NGO refused it as well as the more generous follow-up offer. The NGO chose not to sign the settlement agreement, and instead pursued its interests through appeals to the FERC. The utility company withdrew its offer of an increased resource enhancement fund.  In the end, the FERC granted the company its license with an enhancement fund that was considerably smaller than it could have been had the NGO accepted the company’s offer.

Why did the NGO behave, in the perspective of many involved in the negotiations, so irrationally?  This “irrational” behavior can be viewed within the context of the Ultimatum Game.  The utility company, the allocator, has been granted a resource that it must share, that is, the use of a public good for generating electricity, and profit.  The company offered the NGO, the recipient, a share of the value of this good and the NGO rejected it as being unfair or inequitable and attempted to punish the utility company by denying it a robust, consensus agreement.  However, in addition to the fairness criterion explained by the Ultimatum Game, we can point to four other reasons for this behavior.

The first is strategic.  If the NGO could signal to the FERC a dissatisfaction with the process, it could strengthen its position in relicensing decisions that go beyond the negotiated agreement with the other parties.

A second reason could be the NGO’s inability to place an appropriate value on the utility company’s offer.   Rational choice theory assumes that actors have all available information and can process this information to behave in their own self interest.  It is possible in complex negotiations that recipients cannot process information rationally.  The recipient may not be able to determine the value of positive offers from the allocator’s perspective.  Rejection may be more likely in complex negotiations if the recipient cannot understand the value of what the allocator is giving up.

A third rationale is the preservation of the NGO’s reputation in a negotiation.  Recipients may be concerned about their reputation and establishing a precedent of accepting particular types of offers.  Therefore, they may reject minimal positive offers for fear it damages their reputation and/or compromises their ability to negotiate with other actors.  In this case, if the NGO were part of a regional or national organization, accepting a small positive offer could set a precedent for its regional or national partners in future negotiations.

The fourth reason has to do with justice, which is different from fairness.   Some recipients may be motivated by a sense of justice that extends beyond the traditional view of fairness incorporated in the Ultimatum Game.  The recipient may desire reciprocity for past deeds.  This assumes the allocator and recipient (or those represented by the recipient) have a previous relationship where justice issues were at stake.  In this particular case, as it was rejecting the power company’s offer, the NGO’s representative spoke passionately about how the lands flooded for the hydropower operation sixty years before were acquired at hideously low prices, much of it through eminent domain proceedings from people impoverished by the Great Depression.  The NGO believed strongly that the company should make restitution for past deeds (even though the company was not involved in the original land transactions; it purchased the project from another utility five years before) and donate a large sum in the form of a resource enhancement fund.

The lesson here is that seemingly irrational behaviors by negotiators may be explained, and rationally justified, by the theories underpinning negotiation.  Game theory is one disciplinary approach for helping us understand negotiation behaviors.

Steve Smutko is a professor in the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics at the University of Wyoming and holds the Spicer Chair in Collaborative Practice in UW’s Environment and Natural Resources Program.  Steve conducts research and practice in environmental decision making and teaches courses in negotiation and environmental conflict resolution.

There is an art to staying on message and it involves asking open-ended questions that will allow the other parties to consider and respond to alternatives. This is so much more useful  than simply repeating the same rationale over and over again.  Questions might begin with “ What are the alternatives we have yet to evaluate? or, What else is possible…?”  After this opening, a negotiator might raise a new question for the parties to consider.  Perhaps one negotiator would answer “I don’t think it is possible” and another might say “Well, I don’t know, it may be possible.”  The immediate temptation might be to say something like “There you see…!”  But come back to the theme by suggesting a way to begin the discussion like: “Let’s test that idea.”  This is a way of offering a framework for the discussion that will allow  the negotiating parties to expand their shared understanding of the issues and facts and discover for themselves a way to create a solution that had not previously been considered.

Of course, to stay on message and effectively ask questions requires that you have developed a negotiation strategy before deliberations began – a strategy consistent with the message you want to convey.  As the negotiations progress and you gain a deeper understanding of the facts, issues, needs and perspectives of the other parties, you may need to modify your strategy and alter your message. If you have stayed on message throughout the negotiations and responded rather than reacted to tactics designed to throw you off balance, your opponents will understand that your new message has value and is worth their consideration.

Comment: One reason people are often difficult to negotiate with is because they believe they don’t need to bargain; they think they can get what they want without your help.  If you can walk away without a deal you are in a powerful position.  

“My father said: ‘You must never try to make all the money that’s in a deal. Let the other fellow make some money too, because if you have a reputation for always making all the money, you won’t have many deals.’ ” — J. Paul Getty

Comment: Negotiations are very often as much about the future as they are about the deal at hand.  Relationships are important. Preserving relationships so that future deals can be made is a vital objective in negotiation.

“Failing to prepare is preparing to fail.” — John Wooden

Comment: Many people have probably said this same thing.  We all know that we sometimes “shoot from the hip” or “jump right in” when we are negotiating.  But a little preparation goes a long way.  Simple preparation might include writing a fews talking points so that you have a script to follow, asking colleagues about the person you are going to face in negotiation, or taking a few moments to think what you would do if you were in their shoes.

“If I had eight hours to chop down a tree, I’d spend six sharpening my axe.”  – Abraham Lincoln

Students praised the course and instructors.

“Negotiation  Exercise, Very  educational!”

“Despite  personal  reservations  about  role   playing,  this  was  very  helpful!”

“Had  to  reverse  my  opinion  on  role  playing, it  was  a   good  exercise  and  I  learned  a  lot.”

“Excellent  experience!”

“The  topics,  materials,  and  exercises  were  very  relevant  to  my  work  and  how  I  need  to  be  thinking  about  negotiation.  I  enjoyed  the   instructors’  teaching  styles  and  benefitted  from  their  experience.  I’m  going  to  go  back  and  encourage  others  in  my  organization  to   take  this  class!  Thank  you.”